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Wittgenstein on Aspect-Seeing, the Nature  
of Discursive Consciousness, and the  
Experience of Agency
Richard Eldridge
We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find 
the whole business of seeing puzzling enough. (PI 212f)
1.
Consciousness or awareness is possessed by at least a wide range of 
higher chordates. But genuine discursive consciousness is possessed – 
at least in its complex forms – only by human beings. Only human 
beings can, so it seems, be aware of seeing a given object as this or 
that, under one or another concept. The ability to be thus aware 
informs our perception, giving it both a judgmental character and 
a relation to self-consciousness. We typically see or hear that x is F, 
over and above simply taking in sensations. There is for any one of us 
always the potential to step back from our conceptually structured, 
judgmental perceiving so as to become explicitly aware that it is i who 
have judged that x is F (rather than, say, G). This openness to aware-
ness of one’s own role in judgmental perceiving further opens for us 
the possibility of a normative question arising. Am i correct so to have 
judged? This question does not arise for other higher mammals. They 
do not thus call their own being into question.
Historically, the apparently special character of human judgmen-
tal consciousness has motivated a variety of attempts to explain it, 
including at least Plato’s theory of the immortal soul’s ability to rec-
ollect eternal Forms, Aristotle’s theory of nous as actively instancing 
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essences both in us and in things, and Augustine’s theory of the 
scintilla animae. Kant proposes, somewhat obscurely, that a spontane-
ity of reason stimulates the understanding to produce from its own 
resources the pure or nonempirical concepts of substance and causal-
ity that then figure as part of the implicit substructure of the more 
ordinary empirical concepts we form. (“Cup,” for example, is a sub-
stance-concept; “break” is a causal verb.)
More recently the leading contenders for an explanation of the 
fact – if it is a fact – of the special character of human discursive con-
sciousness have been various forms of materialist naturalism: symbolic 
representations theory and connectionism. Sometimes a generally 
Kantian stance is naturalized, so that the structure of our sorting 
practices is “wired in” (no longer the product of a spontaneity, and no 
longer bound up with the standing possibility of self-awareness), as 
in Chomsky and other forms of post-Piagetian, naturalistic symbolic 
representations theory. Sometimes an empiricist-associationist stance 
is naturalized, and judgmental responsiveness to things is taken to 
arise only out of networks of neural connections, again without refer-
ence to either spontaneity or self-awareness.
When the relations between discursive consciousness, on the one 
hand, and spontaneity and self-awareness, on the other, are thus bro-
ken, then the very idea that we are capable of judging that thus-and-so 
is threatened. We seem then not to be responsible for what we do, but 
to be mere sensing and responding animals (like the dogs and frogs 
with whom we share the earth), incapable of even so much as raising 
the question whether we are correct to judge as we do. Judgments, 
structured by concepts, about how things are, are reduced to com-
plexities of purely caused response. This idea – that human judgment 
does not properly exist as judgment – seems fantastically implausible. 
But then just what are judgment and discursive consciousness? And 
how can they possibly arise in us?
Wittgenstein’s work – early and late – clearly fits into the tradition 
of philosophical investigations of the nature and basis of discursive 
consciousness. The picture theory of meaning in the Tractatus and the 
analysis of the proposition into simple names corresponding to simple 
objects are put forward to elucidate how truth-value-bearing proposi-
tions and thoughts are possible. “There must be something identical 
in a picture [whether proposition or thought] and what it depicts, 
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to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all.” [In Bild und 
Abgebildetem muss etwas identisch sein, damit das eine überhaupt ein Bild des 
anderen sein kann.] (TLP 2.161, emphases added.) Here the “must” and 
“at all” (überhaupt) indicate that the necessity involved is transcenden-
tal or conceptual. it is, so the argument runs, not thinkable that genu-
ine representationality and truth value–bearing judgmental structure 
could be set up otherwise, in thought or in language. Wittgenstein’s 
resolute determination to keep transcendental or purely conceptual 
investigations – philosophy or philosophical logic – separate from 
empirical science as the investigation of contingent states of affairs 
means, however, that no causal-material explanation of what the ele-
ments of pictures (in either thought or language) are, and how they 
interact with simple objects, is on offer. it is a transcendental or log-
ico-philosophical necessity that there are simple names (in thought 
and in language) that can be arranged in a way that corresponds to 
(shares a pictorial form with) an arrangement of simple objects. What 
these simple names (and simple objects) specifically are, and how the 
relevant correspondences are set up, must take care of itself. That they 
must exist and must be able to stand in relations of correspondence is, 
in contrast, something that is necessary in order for there to be truth 
value–bearing thoughts and propositions at all.
in Philosophical Investigations these specific claims about what is tran-
scendentally or logico-philosophically necessary are subjected to crit-
icism. The full-blooded representationality or judgmental-discursive 
character of both thought and language are – it is now proposed – 
matters not of any “substructure” of simple names and simple objects 
lying underneath the surface, but matters rather of words having a 
role within a public language as a matter of common practice. “This 
role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical 
paradoxes” (PI §182). “A person goes by a sign-post [i.e., is able to 
use a word, understands] only insofar as there exists a regular use 
of sign-posts, a custom” (PI §198). “To understand a sentence means 
to understand a language. To understand a language means to be 
master of a technique” (PI §199). “‘How do sentences manage to rep-
resent?’ … Nothing is hidden” (PI §435).
Once we see this – that nothing but the mastery of a technique laid 
down in common, public practice could enable one to assert, judge, or 
state, or to wish, command, hope, fear, or envy, as opposed to having a 
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life only of mere sensory awareness – then we are, so it seems, to cure 
ourselves of our temptation to look for a “deeper”  quasi-scientific or 
metaphysical explanation of discursive consciousness, full-blooded 
representationality, judgmental awareness, or our life with language. 
We are, it seems, to stop hunting for the “superlative fact” that under-
lies and explains these phenomena, to stop groping after “a super-
expression” or “a philosophical superlative” that might describe this 
putatively explanatory superlative fact (PI §192).1 Here the role of com-
mon practices and techniques in making language meaningful and 
making propositional attitudes possible remains, for Wittgenstein, a 
philosophical, logical, or grammatical fact, not simply one empiri-
cal fact among others to be investigated and explained causally. The 
emphasis remains on what must be in place – a technique, a common 
practice, a custom in using words – in order for there to be discursive 
consciousness, understanding, judgmental awareness, propositional 
attitudes, and words with meanings at all.
Notoriously, this stance (especially insofar as it is urged as a thesis 
or conclusion) has occasioned considerable disappointment and hos-
tility in contemporary philosophy, and for good reason, at least prima 
facie. Language and discursive consciousness are, at least in their full-
blooded forms, specific to biologically evolved human beings; linguis-
tic and cognitive performances are generated by human individuals. 
Surely there must, it seems, be some further explanation available of 
the nature and basis of these feats, in the individual and in the spe-
cies. indeed, numbers of readers of Wittgenstein have themselves, in 
the grip of a wish for something deeper, undertaken to go beneath 
noting our grammar and linguistic practice, in the hope of explain-
ing what makes that practice what it is. As a result we are sometimes 
told that Wittgenstein himself held that what counts as understanding 
1 That Wittgenstein is urging this stance of attention to the ordinary on himself, in 
the face of his own temptations otherwise, as much as on us as a kind of statable 
thesis or dogma, but that it is – for him and for us – all but impossible consistently 
to remain in this stance, and finally that peace in relation to the ordinary comes, 
when it comes, fitfully and through the dawning of a sense of gratitude for one’s 
human life (rather than via a discovery of its essence) is the argument of my Leading 
a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), drawing extensively on Stanley Cavell’s reading of Philosophical 
Investigations in The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
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(discursive consciousness) consists in reacting in a way that is simply 
natural (Stroud), in deciding to do this or that (Dummett, Rorty), in 
doing what the community has laid down as correct (Kripke), or in 
fluent conformity to fixed “internal relations” (Baker and Hacker).2
Cognitive science of all kinds has not been slow to sketch possible 
explanations and to undertake to fill in their details through empiri-
cal research. As Jerry Fodor cogently remarks, why can’t we ask ques-
tions such as “What (causally) makes the linguistic form ‘red’ apply to 
red objects?”3 it does not so apply in all cultures; it does for us, we who 
are able to speak English. When we apply the word “red” correctly (or 
incorrectly), we are doing something. Just what are we doing, and how 
do we do it? “How does one become ‘master of a game’ (PI §31)?”4
When these questions do not receive any clear address or answer 
from within Wittgensteinian thinking, then cognitive science and 
neuroscience, with their material causal explanations, will rush in to 
fill the gap. Happily, there is a kind of address or answer to these ques-
tions – and one quite different from what is envisioned in natural-
ist, conventionalist, and communitarian misreadings of Philosophical 
Investigations – in the text of Philosophical Investigations itself, in the 
discussion of seeing-as in Part ii, Section 11 and in related remarks 
about coming to experience the meaning of a word. These remarks (if 
we can follow and make sense of them) have considerable promise for 
filling in a picture of what we are doing when we are judging, under-
standing, entering into a propositional attitude, ordering, wishing, 
hoping, or fearing: participating in all the phenomena of discursive 
consciousness – and a picture that is not “metaphysical” (in referring 
what we do to something else), material-scientific, naturalist-causalist, 
or conventionalist.
in order to see just how these remarks offer such a picture and 
to begin to assess its plausibility, it will be helpful first to turn to 
the recent work of a cultural-developmental-cognitive scientist (if 
that is not too much of an oxymoron) who has drawn extensively on 
2 See Eldridge, Leading a Human Life, 91–112 for description of these readings, criti-
cism of them, and an alternative.
3 See Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (New york: Thomas y. Crowell, 1975), 
2–9 for this argument in favor of the sense of this causalist question.
4 Compare the discussion of Fodor’s causalism in Eldridge, Leading a Human 
Life, 150.
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Wittgenstein’s work on seeing-as. in The Cultural Origins of Human 
Cognition, Michael Tomasello has surveyed the existing studies of 
primate “cognition” and of human cognitive development.5 Drawing 
on these studies as well as on Wittgenstein, Tomasello has devel-
oped a persuasive account of just what we do in learning language 
and in learning to understand under concepts. This account is not 
simply causalist, not simply conventionalist, and not in any sense 
homuncularist-intellectualist. After tracing Tomasello’s account of 
the details of this learning process, we will then be in a position to 
turn to the details of Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing-as, ready 
to be alert both to how seeing-as plays a fundamental role in learn-
ing to understand and to how seeing-as and learning to understand 
are things that we do, as opposed to things that merely happen in 
us. We will be able then to follow Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the 
(co-)dawning of discursive consciousness and agency and about 
the human circumstances, plights, and possibilities that come with 
these dawnings.
2.
Tomasello’s story runs as follows. “individual human beings possess 
a biologically inherited capacity for living culturally.”6 To say that they 
have a (second-order) capacity, rather than an explicit first-order 
ability,7 for living culturally is to say that they are the kinds of beings 
who can learn to produce fluent, conceptually structured, cultural 
performances, not that they come into the world already explicitly 
able to produce them. There is a biological contribution to becoming 
a concept-mongering, acculturated being, but that contribution does 
not take the form of already possessing concepts in any way.
The development of explicit linguistic, conceptual, and cultural 
abilities then depends crucially on ontogenetic-developmental 
5 Michael Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). Many of the studies cited by Tomasello are his own; oth-
ers are by eminent researchers including Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Nelson, 
Premack, Woodruff, Meltzoff, and Gopnik.
6 ibid., 53 (emphasis added).
7 Aristotle distinguishes capacities or second-order abilities to acquire abilities from 
explicit, first-order abilities in Physics 8.4.255a30 ff.
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processes “by which human children actively exploit and make use of 
both their biological and cultural inheritances.”8 These
historical and ontogenetic processes … are enabled but not in any way deter-
mined by human beings’ biological adaptations for a special form of social 
cognition. … it is these processes, not any specialized biological adapta-
tions directly, that have done the actual work in creating many, if not all, of 
the most distinctive and important cognitive products and processes of the 
 species Homo sapiens.9
Two crucial dimensions of these processes are that they involve chil-
dren actively doing something, and that they require and involve iden-
tification with other human beings as havers of a point of view. Members of 
other species likewise identify with conspecifics, and they may “pick up” 
behaviors via patterning, in the way that songbirds, for example, will 
pick up a species-typical song. But the identification of human children 
with other human beings is, in contrast, both deeper and point-of-view–
related. “Human beings ‘identify’ with conspecifics more deeply than 
do other primates. This identification is not something mysterious, but 
simply the process by which the human child understands that other 
persons are beings like herself – in a way that inanimate objects are not, 
for example – and so she sometimes tries to understand things from 
their point of view.”10 Hence the process of the development of linguis-
tic and cognitive skills on the part of the child is a process of sociogenesis; 
it requires other havers of points of view. So-called “wild children,” or 
children otherwise biologically growing up under conditions of severe 
deprivation of human interaction, do not develop sophisticated lin-
guistic and cognitive skills; many autistic children master them only in 
part; and other species do not master them at all.11
Other primates do respond to their environments in sophisticated 
ways that involve both rich sensory awareness and differential response 
or classificatory abilities. They remember the locations of things in 
their environment, assume object persistence, match small numerosi-
ties, recognize and represent relations of kinship and rank, cooperate 
in problem-solving tasks, and more.12 What they do not do, however, 
 8 Tomasello, Human Cognition, 11, emphasis added.
 9 ibid.
10 ibid., 14.
11 ibid., 14, 8.
12 ibid., 16–17, 19.
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is “view the world in terms of … underlying causes and intentional/
mental states. … Nonhuman primates are themselves intentional and 
causal beings, they just do not understand the world in intentional and 
causal terms.”13 Underlying their failure so to understand the world is 
the fact that nonhuman primates “do not participate in extended joint 
attentional interactions in the same way as human children.”14
in contrast, children engage soon after birth in “protoconversa-
tions” with adults, that is, “social interactions in which the parent 
and infant focus their attention on one another – often in a face-to-
face manner involving looking, touching and vocalizing – in ways 
that serve to express and share basic emotions.”15 By the age of nine 
to twelve months, children engage in “ joint attentional behaviors 
that seem to indicate an emerging understanding of other persons 
as intentional agents like the self.”16 Within these joint attentional 
behaviors, a “referential triangle of child, adult, and the object or 
event to which they share attention” is set up.17 Crucially this refer-
ential triangle involves the joint focusing of attention on a thing or 
event construed in a certain way within the game. That (the soft plush 
item on the floor) is a rabbit, or Pooh’s friend, or the one who is 
resting from hopping, or the toy Aunt Sadie gave you, as the context 
may be.
One comes – all at once – to be able to use words to refer to things, 
and distinctly and self-consciously to conceive of things in particu-
lar ways, in and through participation in joint attentional behaviors 
and referential triangles. Hence “linguistic reference is a social act 
in which one person attempts to get another person to focus her 
attention on something in the world” that has been construed in 
a certain way within the context of the scene.18 As the child moves 
13 ibid., 19.
14 ibid., 36.
15 ibid., 59. Compare R. G. Collingwood on the development of personhood, point 
of view having, and cognitive and linguistic skills in the child through a com-
plex play of contestation and expression with an adult, in The Principles of Art 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 239–41.
16 Tomasello, Human Cognition, 61.
17 ibid., 62. Compare Donald Davidson on referential triangles in “The Second 
Person” and “The Emergence of Thought,” Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 107–21 (see especially 117–21) and 123–34 (see 
especially 128–29).
18 Tomasello, Human Cognition, 97.
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within these scenes from an initial biologically supported mimicry 
and into more flexible and evolving play, in which objects are con-
strued and reconstrued as this or that, genuine, self-conscious point-
of-view–having develops. The child becomes aware that this object 
can be construed- or conceived-as this or that, in this or that chang-
ing context of goals, aims, and emotions, and so she comes to be 
aware both of the multiple kinds of things objects are, and of herself 
as a construer and conceiver.19
What Tomasello calls the internalization of a linguistic symbol, 
which is initially used by the adult within a joint attentional interac-
tion, as a symbol involves the learning all at once of words, concepts 
(construals of the ways things are), point of view, and of self and other 
as havers of points of view. This internalization takes the child well 
beyond the kinds of merely perceptual representations that she oth-
erwise shares with other higher chordates:
As the child internalizes a linguistic symbol – as she learns the human per-
spectives embodied in a linguistic symbol – she cognitively represents not 
just the perceptual or motoric aspects of a situation but also one way, among 
other ways of which she is aware, that the current situation may be attention-
ally construed by “us”, the users of that symbol. The way that human beings 
use linguistic symbols thus creates a clear break with straightforward per-
ceptual or sensory-motor representations, and it is due entirely to the social 
nature of linguistic symbols.20
Genuine linguistic symbols are hence something more than apt 
response–based sensory-perceptual representations. instead they 
have, in Tomasello’s phrasing, “human perspectives embodied” in 
them:
in different communicative situations one and the same object may be con-
strued as a dog, an animal, a pet, or a pest; one and the same event may 
be construed as running, moving, fleeing, or surviving; one and the same 
place may be construed as the coast, the shore, the beach, or the sand – all 
depending on the communicative goals of the speaker. … As perspectivally 
based cognitive representations, then, linguistic symbols are based not on 
the recording of direct sensory or motor experiences, as are the cognitive 
19 Compare Cavell on language-learning in “Learning a Word,” The Claim of Reason, 
169–80.
20 Tomasello, Human Cognition, 126.
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750663.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 22 Feb 2018 at 19:57:09, subject to the Cambridge
Aspect-Seeing, Discursive Consciousness, and Agency 171
representations of other animal species and human infants, but rather on 
the ways in which individuals choose to construe things out of a number of 
other ways they might have construed them, as embodied in the other avail-
able linguistic symbols that they might have chosen, but did not.21
Genuine symbolic representations or linguistic symbols (as 
opposed to perceptual representations only) are, then, all at once 
public, intersubjectively shared, and perspectival, i.e., saturated 
with “embodied construals” of how things are, which are salient in 
relation to certain goals, purposes, and contexts of joint attention. 
Unlike either mere perceptual representations or animal signals, 
they embody an available construal of things, and they enable genu-
ine communicative action through their use. The availability of these 
symbolic representations to a now developed genuine subject, in pos-
session of explicit cognitive and linguistic skills, marks the differ-
ence, in Aristotelian terminology, between a being with phantasia or 
sensory awareness alone, and a being for whom phantasia is informed 
and structured by nous, whose awareness is then fully discursive. But 
this difference in the structure of awareness – the emergence of 
the very life of a person – is brought about neither by the agency of 
nous, nor by biology plus causal conditioning alone, but instead by 
a sociogenetic process involving the development from mimicry to 
participation in joint attentional interactions. Full-blooded, discur-
sively structured consciousness comes by way of developing through 
attentional interactions the skill of using genuine symbolic represen-
tations that embody construals.
3.
At first blush, there are significant differences between Tomasello’s 
story of the development of discursive consciousness, self-consciously 
influenced by Philosophical Investigations though it is, and Wittgenstein’s 
investigations into aspect-seeing. Tomasello’s account is built up out 
of observations available in the primate observation and child devel-
opment literatures. That account is part of an empirical inquiry into 
what is going on as a matter of fact. Wittgenstein, in contrast, reminds 
21 ibid., 8–9.
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himself (and us) that “Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual 
one. … What is at issue is the fixing of concepts [Begriffsbestimmungen]” 
(PI 203e, 204g).
Looked at more closely, however, these differences are less 
striking. To begin with, Tomasello’s story is not itself derived from 
experimental results, but is instead developed out of conceptually self-
conscious observation of what children (and primates) do (and don’t 
do). What we do in learning language is neither reduced to, nor 
explained by, purely material processes, according to Tomasello. 
What we do involves the development and exercise of an ability 
(based on a prior innate capacity) in actual practice. Nothing is hid-
den, one might say.
Conversely, Wittgenstein connects his investigation of aspect- seeing 
more closely with the learning of language than might initially meet 
the eye. He remarks at one point on “a game played by children: they 
say that a chest, for example, is a house; and thereupon it is inter-
preted as a house in every detail. A piece of fancy is worked into it” (PI 
206e). This remark suggests that the appearance of fancy (invention; 
Erfindung) within game-playing in the life of a child is akin to seeing 
an aspect. When we then further notice the remark that seeing an 
aspect bears “a close kinship with ‘experiencing the meaning of a 
word’ ” (PI 210c; see also 214d), then the suggestion is not far off that 
it is by exercising fancy (inventiveness, imagination) within the con-
text of game-playing that children come to learn language at all (by 
catching on to the aspects of things that are “embodied” in words).
Even the remark about the fixing of concepts (PI 204h) itself 
admits, in context, of two different, compatible readings. What is 
at issue is, first, what the concept (or various concepts) of seeing and 
visual experience are – that is, what it makes sense, conceptually, to 
compare these phenomena to, and how to understand them – but 
also, second, how concepts get fixed at all within our seeing: how does 
our seeing itself come to be discursively structured, how do concepts 
get fixed (determined; bestimmt) in it.
This latter reading is decisively reinforced, repeatedly, throughout 
the discussion of seeing an aspect. That discussion begins by noting 
a difference between “two uses of the word ‘see’ ”: one in which one 
might report having had a piece of sensory awareness by saying, “i see 
this,” accompanied by a description or drawing or copy; and one in 
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which one sees “a likeness between these two faces” – i.e., two things 
(faces) are compared with one another (PI 193a). This difference 
between two kinds of seeing resembles the difference in English (and 
German) between “see” (sehen) as it takes an object accusative (“i see 
x”), and “see” as it takes a propositional accusative (“i see that x is 
F ”). The achievement described in the latter, propositional accusative 
form is necessarily conceptually structured in a way that the former 
having of a visual impression need not be.22 (A frog can see the fly, 
but not see that that is a fly – does it see that it is a bluebottle or a 
May fly? – and cannot be implicitly aware of itself as so seeing. it can-
not report the content of its awareness in the form of a proposition, 
even to itself.) Wittgenstein notes that there are two kinds of seeing 
in question here: what one might call seeing as mere visual awareness, 
and “discursive” seeing or seeing informed by conceptualization, 
wherein a noticed aspect can be reported. About noticing an aspect, 
he observes that “it must be possible to give both remarks [both ‘But 
this isn’t seeing!’ and ‘But this is seeing!’] a conceptual justification” 
[Beide müssen sich begrifflich rechtfertigen lassen]: both ways of speaking 
must admit of being conceptually justified; both must be regarded as 
conceptually legitimate (PI 203c). And this is as much as to say that 
there are two concepts of seeing that must be distinguished. One is 
the having of visual awareness, without any conceptualization; the 
other involves “a modified concept of sensation” (einen modifizierten 
Empfindugsbegriff) (PI 209h), where sensing (seeing and hearing) 
include that one notices or recognizes something (for example, recog-
nizes a face as timid: “ihn [ein Gesichtseindruck] als furchtsam … erkennt” 
[PI 209h]). This latter kind of sensation involves having concepts as 
part of its very structure, in a way that having visual awareness alone 
does not. We are, Wittgenstein writes, “interested in the concept 
[of noticing an aspect; that is, of discursively informed experience] 
22 The remark at PI 193a both notes and muddies a contrast between a more sim-
ple, accusative, “mere” visual awareness, on the one hand, and visual recognition 
under a concept, on the other, since it contrasts two uses of “see” on the part of 
an already competent language-user. Nor is it any part of Wittgenstein’s project to 
trace a material-causal history of concept acquisition. Normal visual perception 
on the part of competent language-users just is conceptually structured. But as 
Wittgenstein later notes, recognitive visual awareness involves “a modified concept 
of sensation” (PI 209h) from that which we might reasonably take other chordate 
mammals to possess.
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and its place among the concepts of experience” [seine Stellung in den 
Erfahrungsbegriffen] (PI 193e).
That is to say, seeing-as involves a different kind of experience, or 
experience in a different sense than having sensory awareness alone. 
Thus it is, Wittgenstein writes, “not part of perception” or “does not 
belong to perception” [Das “Sehen als …” gehört nicht zur Wahrnehmung] 
(PI 197a) – there is more to it than takes place in sensory awareness 
alone. “And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like”; it 
“seems half visual experience, half thought”; “if you are having the 
visual experience expressed by the exclamation [‘Now i see it as a …’], 
you are also thinking of what you see” (PI 197a,d,c). When i suddenly 
recognize [erkenne] an acquaintance in a crowd, “is this a special sort 
of seeing? is it a case of both seeing and thinking? or an amalgam [eine 
Verschmelzung] of the two, as i should almost like to say?” (PI 197h). 
Unlike mere sensing, seeing-as “demands imagination” or “requires 
power of imagination” [braucht es Vorstellungskraft] (PI 207h).
Within the fusion of seeing and thinking that is noticing an aspect, 
there are not two separable stages: first the perception, then the con-
cept application. it is all immediate within the act of seeing-as. “No 
squeezing, no forcing [of a perceived object into an interpretation 
held apart and ready for it] took place here” (PI 200e). “So we interpret 
[what we notice an aspect of], and see it as we interpret it” (PI 193f).
What Wittgenstein calls “the ‘continuous seeing’ [stetigen Sehen] of 
an aspect” (PI 194b) is, for us who have come to be able to use lan-
guage, the normal form of seeing. it is distinguished from explicitly 
noticing an aspect shift, or what Wittgenstein calls “the ‘dawning’ of 
an aspect” [das Aufleuchten eines Aspekts; its flashing or lighting up] (PI 
194). The philosophical interest of this latter experience of the dawn-
ing of an aspect is that it makes evident, to and for us, who are now 
already conceptually conscious, something of what the experience of 
coming to be discursively aware of things is like.
The dawning of an aspect is not just a matter of “perceptual” or 
“mental” or “neural” events occurring in me. Crucially, it involves my 
actively placing the object seen in a context of comparisons: seeing 
“a likeness” [eine Ähnlichkeit; a similarity] (PI 193a), not just seeing 
an object. For example, when i see the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then i 
would, if i were asked to explain my perception, set about “pointing to 
all sorts of pictures of rabbits, [and i] should perhaps have pointed to 
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real rabbits, talked about their habits, or given an imitation of them” 
(PI 194d; see also 196a ff.). i set the object seen in a certain field of 
comparisons, within my very act of seeing.
This setting of the object seen within a field of comparisons is some-
thing i do in relation to other objects and pictures of objects in the 
world. What Wittgenstein calls the “organization” [die Organisation] 
(PI 196b ff.) that i bring to the seeing of an object as such-and-such is 
not any framework or pattern “inside” my mind or brain. it is, rather, 
an organization or arrangement that i see in or among the things that 
i discursively see. When i am able to achieve such an organization or 
arrangement of the objects of my experience, then i have a power to 
respond to things that i had previously lacked. When i say, “Now i see 
it as a …” then “the very expression which is also a report of what is 
seen, is here a cry of recognition” [ein Ausruf des Erkennens] (PI 198a). 
There is a kind of triumph in accession to felt power in the entry into 
concept-suffused perception.23 Now i can and do “describe what i am 
seeing differently” (PI 202b). i can actively connect this with that, 
within an organized field, rather than having sensory experience sim-
ply “come to me.” i can and do now turn my attention on this or that, 
attend to this or that, notice or see that this is (like) that.
How do i do this? Again, not through the occurrence of “inner 
processes” alone of any kind, but through picking up on resemblances 
and on patterns of attention to them that are associated with words. 
“The substratum of this experience [of noticing an aspect, and so also 
of coming to ‘see discursively’ at all] is the mastery of a technique” (PI 
208e). it is the mastery of the technique of attention to comparisons, 
of seeing likenesses, that makes discursive experience possible:
“Now he’s seeing it like this”, “now like that” would only be said of someone 
capable [imstande] of making certain applications of the figure quite freely 
[with fluency; mit Geläufigkeit]. … it is only if someone can do [kann], has 
learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this 
experience. (PI 208e, 209a)
Hearing a word with understanding is like this as well. (“The 
importance of this concept [of aspect-blindness] lies in the 
23 Compare, again, Collingwood on the emergence of a sense of self-as-agent out of 
mere sensory awareness, through the organization effected by picking up on pat-
terns of attending, in The Principles of Art, 203–6, 234–41.
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connection between the concepts of ‘seeing an aspect’ and 
 ‘experiencing the meaning of a word’ ” [PI 214d].) Experiencing 
the meaning of a word – hearing it with discursive understanding – 
likewise involves (internalized) mastery of a technique of making 
connections between this word and various possible contexts of use, 
associated with various construals embodied in the word as a tool 
in use. “Hearing a word in a particular sense. How queer that there 
should be such a thing! Phrased like this, emphasized like this, heard 
in this way, this sentence is the first of a series in which a transition 
is made to these sentences, pictures, actions. ((A multitude of famil-
iar paths lead off from these words in every direction))” (PI §534). 
Language itself, Wittgenstein observes, is “a labyrinth of paths. you 
approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the 
same place from another side and no longer know your way about” 
(PI §203). The skill of knowing one’s way about is a matter of know-
ing what one can do next – mastering the technique for it – in such 
a way that one immediately sees or hears these words as leading to 
these next possible responses. This kind of discursive understanding 
of words – knowing (in seeing and hearing) what can come next – is 
like understanding a theme in music: knowing what can (or even 
must) come next in it:
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in 
music than one may think. … Why is just this the pattern of variation in loud-
ness and tempo? One would like to say “Because i know what it’s all about”. 
But what is it all about? i should not be able to say. in order to “explain” i 
could only compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (i mean 
the same pattern). (One says, “Don’t you see, this is as if a conclusion were 
being drawn” or “This is as it were a parenthesis”, etc.). (PI §527, second and 
third emphases added)
One must learn actually to hear or see in the words or notes that are 
present in experience the possibilities (sometimes even the necessities) 
of further transitions to just this or that. “What happens when we 
learn to feel [empfinden] the ending of a church mode as an ending?” 
(PI §535). – We are then part of a form of life and able to move flu-
ently within it, masters of a particular technique for making connec-
tions, itself internalized within the very act of attentive, discursively 
informed perception.
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4.
The development of this explicit ability to hear or see in words or 
notes possibilities of connection to further words or notes is a matter 
of learning actively to do something, of developing an explicit abil-
ity out of an innate capacity on the basis of training in response to 
samples, within scenes of joint attentional interaction. The abilities 
that are thus developed are holistic, not modular. it is true that deaf 
children can learn language (both to “speak” ASL or another sign 
language, and to read and write English), and people who are unable 
to carry or recognize a tune can be fluent native speakers. As a result 
of brain injury, subjects can develop an inability to recognize faces, 
while retaining their linguistic abilities. To this extent, these abili-
ties can be modularized. Nonetheless the development of any one of 
these abilities is not a strictly self-contained modular phenomenon. 
The abilities to hear words with discursive understanding, to recog-
nize pictures as pictures of such-and-such (to see aspects), to hear a 
melody with understanding, to count, to recognize and respond to 
facial expressions, to repeat nursery rhymes, and more, all inform 
and feed off one another. Massive deficits in some areas tend to gen-
erate massive deficits in other areas, as in many cases of autism, in 
which the inability to respond to facial expressions of emotion under-
mines the development of language.
in moving from innate capacity to explicit ability to make connec-
tions (within the very act of discursive perception), seeing others as 
persons with points of view is crucial. PI §§536–39 compare expe-
riencing the meaning of a word and hearing the development of a 
melody with seeing timidity, say, in a face, and this comparison recurs 
throughout Part ii, Section 11: for example, in discussions of react-
ing to the expression of a human face (PI 194c), of recognizing a face 
as timid or as sad (PI 209h, d), and of recognizing “a genuine lov-
ing look” on the basis of “imponderable evidence” (PI 228b–d). One 
must catch on to what is done by other people as they respond discur-
sively to things, to their ways of noticing and responding to aspects. in 
order to move into explicitly discursive consciousness, “What has to 
be accepted, the given, is—so one could say— forms of life” (PI 226d).
The fluent abilities that one acquires through such acceptance, 
achieved via participation in joint attentional interactions, confer on 
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the thus emergent subject of experience (in a new sense of “expe-
rience”) a kind of power. Wittgenstein’s image is that of being able 
to move along a path (“A multitude of familiar paths leads off from 
these words in every direction”), or of knowing how to go on. One 
becomes a subject of experience rather than only passively subject to 
experience.24 One is able to notice, actively, the aspects of things.
Coming to have this ability brings with it certain risks and also 
certain possibilities of satisfaction in the rightness of fitting words or 
things into contexts. The risk is that things themselves do not guar-
antee the aptness of connecting them one with another in a certain 
way. it is possible that certain (though not all) of the connections 
one makes will be repudiated or found opaque by others, especially 
when the concepts under which connections are made are abstract 
and “philosophical.” (How can you call that love or respect or fairness 
or meaningful or syntactically organized or convincing?) But then 
it is also possible to feel satisfaction in the aspects of things that one 
notices and in the genuineness of the connections that are thus seen 
or heard. it is possible for a noticing of an aspect to take the form of 
an exclamation (PI 197b), involving a kind of immediate “Aha!” experi-
ence in seeing something as something.
in the exercise of this ability, there will always be some possibili-
ties both of novel noticings ( jokes? metaphors? invitations of intima-
cies?), and of noticings that are felt to be wayward or incoherent, by 
others or by oneself upon reflection (failed jokes? failed metaphors? 
failed invitations?). Distinct success is possible. One can see concep-
tually what is there to be seen. But the exercise of the abilities to see 
conceptually and to make connections between experiences (words, 
notes, faces, objects) always remains at the edges loosely bounded, 
at the edges quite unlike the ability to grasp “internal relations” 
between words and concepts that are “fixed.” And the possibility of 
(further, other) action at the edges always surrounds action in notic-
ing as such. (“A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words 
in every direction.”) Some may be blind to the aspects of things that 
others see, may be blind to the aspects of things that i see.
24 See Robert B. Pippin’s development of this distinction in his “Hegel’s Ethical 
Rationalism” in Pippin, Idealism as Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 425.
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Aspect-seeing centrally involves doing something: mastering a tech-
nique and acting according to it (or extending it), as a result of “taking 
to” joint attentional interactions. in so describing aspect- seeing, and in 
casting it as lying at the heart of discursive consciousness, Wittgenstein 
is defending both the priority of practice over theoretical representa-
tion and the irreducibility of agency to material processes. The ability 
actively and agentively to see one thing as another develops as one 
“takes to” a going practice. it is not and cannot be the result of mate-
rial processes alone, though it is “built on top of” sensory-motor aware-
ness that includes genuine “world-intake.” Neither conceptual practice 
nor anyone’s actively “taking to it” can be reduced to independent and 
self-subsistent material or mental processes.
Hence Wittgenstein’s treatment of aspect-seeing offers us a way 
of thinking about human discursive consciousness that is neither 
mentalist, nor materialist, nor social constructivist, nor any kind of 
explanation. it is rather an elucidatory redescription of what we do 
when we employ concepts within acts of seeing. in developing this 
redescription, which includes attention to the roles of agency and 
interaction with other persons, Wittgenstein places the idea of a per-
son as an agent among agents – with all the anxieties, wishes, fears, 
desires, moods, and possibilities of felt satisfaction that come with 
coming to be an explicit participant in conceptual practice – at the 
center of thinking about discursive consciousness. Wittgenstein’s elu-
cidatory redescription will not be to everyone’s liking. it is, again, 
not a material explanation of how discursive consciousness arises in 
and through natural processes alone. it is rather, one might say, an 
invitation to see human mindedness, discursive consciousness, as like 
this: to notice its aspects. This invitation is “grounded” in a survey 
of the phenomena of discursiveness. it does not have the status of 
a command, grounded in pure rational-intellectual access to things 
in themselves, to see a discovered material or mental “essence.” This 
invitational, elucidatory redescription of discursive consciousness is 
apt to regard itself as “one of the heirs of the subject that used to be 
called ‘philosophy’ ” (BB 28) – an intimate offering to us of a way of 
looking at ourselves.
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